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Executive Summary 1
Our research on the competitive-
ness of the Serbian economy indicates
that Serbia is on the 69th place of 76
countries analyzed. Several recent stud-
ies suggest that Serbia’s export is far
less than its potential. This gap between
real and potential trade, especially to
the developed markets of the European
Union and the United States, is a
tremendous opportunity.  The tenacity
of that gap is among Serbia’s greatest
risks.  Moreover, the moment of oppor-
tunity for Serbia to exploit its low cost
labor position will quickly fade, erasing
existing comparative advantages in agri-
culture, textiles and depletable natural
resources. Serbia must strive now for
more competitive firms products and
sectors and to give the space for the
propagation of product specialization if
the country is to generate the exports
over time necessary to sustain growth
and development.1 A key to the success
in this effort to secure market potential
for export is through the stimulation of
trade with neighboring countries – to
dampen the temptation for nations of
southeast Europe to compete with each
other for trade rather than to develop
product differentiation and niche spe-
cialization.
This aim of this project is to ana-
lyze the competitive position of the
Serbian economy and to propose vari-
ous paths for the positive development
of that position. This study also exam-
ines the main channels through which
competition affects aggregate economic
performance in Serbia, e.g. the balance
of payments and the regular servicing
of foreign debt.  
The competitive position of a
country cannot be understood only
from the macroeconomic perspective.
Firms and sectors are competitive, not
countries. As such, this study places a
strong emphasis on microeconomic
analysis as well as more traditional
macroeconomic analysis. Alternative
scenarios of economic politics – the
dynamics and pace of institutional
reforms and the restructuring of privati-
zation of companies - are modeled and
projected forward for five years to
demonstrate the cost and benefit of var-
ious policy options for Serbia’s compet-
itive position.  
In short, the project is divided into
four main sections: Macroeconomic
analysis, Microeconomic case studies,
Econometric Projections of reform sce-
narios, and Policy Recommendations.
The final product serves as a contribu-
tion to both the macroeconomic policy
discourse in Serbia and to the prospec-
tive investor who considers opportuni-
ties in Serbia.
1. Competitiveness and Development
1.1. Two concepts of competitive-
ness. We make a distinction between
two basic concepts of competitiveness:
Micro competitiveness which refers to
competitiveness of enterprises as their
Competitiveness of the
Serbian Economy
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1 Growth does not always facilitate development.  Serbia's policy on competitiveness must address both.  See Kamal
Malhotra, et al. "Making Global Trade Work for People," UNDP, 2003.
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relative advantage over other enterpris-
es and Macro competitiveness which
purports competitiveness of economy
as a whole. Our research is structured
in two basic segments as well.
1.2. Policy of strengthening competi-
tiveness and exchange rate. Selection
of a currency regime for transition coun-
tries (in this context Serbia should not
be an exception) depends on several
economic factors that change over time.
Late transition requires a different cur-
rency arrangement than what exists at
the beginning of the transition process. 
European transition countries pass
through three common phases related
to currency regime: 1) at the beginning,
they adopt a fixed regime or narrow
fluctuation regime, 2) after key structur-
al changes and establishment of a mar-
ket system based on higher GDP
growth, they adopt a regime of man-
aged rate fluctuation with different lev-
els of control, 3) after fulfilling econom-
ic, social, legal and political conditions
(which should enable them to enter the
European Union) they adopt the fixed
rate (i.e. EMR II regime, which repre-
sents some kind of «waiting room» for
entering the European Monetary Union
and switching from national currencies
to EUR). 
1.3. Development and Investments in
Serbia. After negative GDP growth
rates (-6% on anual basis) along with
negative efficiency during the 80's, in
the 1990's less than 50% of depreciated
fixed assets were reinvested. The data
on investment in industrial equipment
in the 90's offers an even less favorable
image: below 15% of depreciated value,
and during the last years of the past
decade this statistic fell even below
10%. Depreciation was uncritically
included in current consumption, which
sabotaged the basis of further econom-
ic growth, while the standard of living
was sustained at an artificially high
level. Some projections suggest that
investments might reach 20% of GDP in
Serbia by 2005. For the purposes of
comparison, the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development
(EBRD) evaluated that relative to all
Central and Eastern European countries,
in 2001 the share of investments in GDP
was largest in Czech Republic at 35%
and lowest in Croatia at 23%.
The structure of Serbia's economy
is almost identical to that of 25 years
ago. Production was dropping and
fixed capital was overflowing into con-
sumption. In terms of the level of devel-
opment, measured with GDP per capi-
ta, in 2001 our position was close to
25% of the position we had compared
to Slovenia in 1989. Concretely, in 1989,
GDP per capita in Serbia and
Montenegro (excluding Kosovo) totaled
half of Slovenia’s GDP per capita. In
2001 GDP of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia totaled between 12% and
13% of Slovenian GDP. A huge gap also
exists in comparison to Central
European countries, which are now in
the EU. Our GDP per capita is close to
one quarter of the GDP of the weakest
country from this group. The informal
economy, the effect of which can not
be precisely determined, contributed a
certain extent to the moderation of neg-
ative consequences on living standard,
but can not serve as the foundation for
development.
Taking into consideration different
versions of the average equipment life-
time, it can be concluded that industrial
equipment has depreciated to 12%–15%
of its real value in 1989. This technolo-
gy base is now inefficient and out-of-
date with modern market requirements.
The lack of investments in modern
equipment and technology thereby
directly influenced the fall of Serbia’s
economic competitiveness. Together
with the political and economic closing
of the country, this represented the key
factor of unfavorable development in
the export field i.e. in the balance of
payments.
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2. Analysis of Dynamics of Foreign Trade
2.1. Sector Indicators of
Competitiveness and Revealed
Comparative Advantage (RCA).
Sector analysis of the results reveals the
unfavorable export structure of Serbia
and Montenegro – the share of food
and live animals (sector 0) is dominant
in export, as well as the share of prod-
ucts sorted by material (sector 6) – fore-
most various semi-products. The analy-
sis also shows deterioration of the struc-
ture of export during the 90s: with the
share of the zero sector increasing,
while the importance of machines and
transportation (sector 7) and chemical
products (sector 5) are declining, i.e.
products with the highest level of
industrial processing. During the entire
period, in the export structure is domi-
nated by labor and resource intensive
products. Recent efforts at foreign trade
liberalization were followed by greater
diverification of export, which demon-
strates Serbia's extremely low special-
ization.
Empirically established compara-
tive advantage is called Revealed
Comparative Advantage (RCA). At the
level of total trade the RCA indicator
represents the relation between foreign
trade balance and the total volume of
trade. In the period from 1989 to 2002
RCA reveals a major decrease of com-
petitiveness of Serbia and Montenegro's
export.  While in 1989 the foreign trade
deficit totaled only 7,3% of trade and in
1990 -  12,4%, in 2002 it reached 47,1%.
The number of product groups with a
positive RCA preactically halved after
1989. Comparative advantage was
maintained predominantly in primary
products.
The European Union is still the
most important trading partner for
Serbia and Montenegro. However, as
the result of the non-competitive export
position of Serbia's products, the goods
deficit with the EU accounts for over
40% of total foreign trade deficit. 
In general, exchange rate depreci-
ation stimulates export. However, the
structure of supply of our goods and
services is very modest and therefore it
is not very likely that lowering their
price could stimulate import demand
for those products. In the case of low-
ered prices of domestic products import
demand elasticity is extremely small
and depreciation of exchange rate
woud not "pay off". The poor quality of
Serbia's products, lack of certified prod-
ucts, small number of products adjusted
to new international standards, small
series, loss of former distribution net-
work, impossibility of sale crediting,
etc. prevent a larger part of the econo-
my, especially industry, from increasing
export in the short term, regardless of
the exchange rate.  In fact, the stimula-
tion of export through a depreciated
dinar exchange rate under present con-
ditions is all but impossible.
The export position can expand
only through improvements in the real
sphere of the economy – through pro-
ductivity growth and through improve-
ment of product quality; through the
use of modern technology and modern
management techniques and through
efficient production processes.
2.2. Export dependence and non-
price competitiveness factors. Based
on the results of econometric analysis,
the effect of export dynamics on cycles
of industrial production (as indicators of
economic activity) and export’s effect
on the fiscal burden proxied by real
public revenues per industrial produc-
tion unit are in the long-term equally
important. The relation between short-
term export oscillations, on production
oscillations, and export dependence on
unit labor costs is of lesser significance.
There is no significant relation between
export and exchange rate, whether stat-
ed in dollars, EUR or based on the bas-
ket of currencies. 
Nowdays prices have much less
importance in explaining competitive-
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ness than they had in the past.
However, prices are still an important
competitiveness factor in countries that
have low income per capita (markets
sensitive to changes of prices) and also
in cases of high-standardized products
(such as stock products). In cases of
products with a higher level of final
processing, the price competitiveness
factor looses its importance, while non-
price factors become more important,
especially quality, easy-to-use features,
product life-time, safety, reliability,
terms of delivery, warranty period, serv-
icing and supply of parts. All the above
mentioned characteristics are called
non-price competitiveness factors.
Precisely in processed goods Serbia, has
recorded major drops of competitive-
ness, especially due to the influence of
non-price competitiveness factors.
3. Microeconomic Aspects of
Competitiveness
Microeconomic research of the
competitiveness of the Serbian econo-
my fell into two phases:
I Elite Interviews to collet qualita-
tive attitudes of Serbian businessmen,
based on the basic concepts of interna-
tional competitiveness from the modern
economic literature;
II Field Survey phase and con-
struction of the Microeconomic
Competitiveness Index.
3.1. Elite Interviews resulted in the
following conclusions concerning the
most important competitiveness factors:
Exchange rate. Labor intensive
enterprises with large number of work-
ers (for instance the textile industry)
consider that the exchange rate is
depreciated, since foreign currencies
obtained from export are used for pay-
ment of employees' salaries. Less labor
intensive companies, which have a
large share of export in total sale, pre-
fer a stable over a fluctuating exchange
rate, since they prefer predictability in
the realization of business plans.
Banking sector. Majority of busi-
nessmen emphasize that the banking
sector in Serbia does not correspond to
the modern needs of businessmen.
Specific objections refer to: lack of cred-
its and very large gap between active
and passive interest rates. A more sig-
nificant role of the state is expected to
support export expansion, through state
subsidies in crediting export and pro-
duction.
Marketing Majority of enterprises
emphasize that they do not have devel-
oped marketing and that they are not
very oriented toward satisfying con-
sumers' needs. Serbian businessmen
emphasize they export mostly under
foreign trademarks.
Consumer ethnocentrism.
Consumers in Serbia express a signifi-
cant tendency toward foreign trade-
marks, even toward those coming from
the countries Serbia was in war with. In
the region of the Balkans, Serbs show
the highest tendency for shopping
abroad. Although they do not often
travel abroad, Serbs purchase products
of higher value. Consumers from sur-
rounding regions do not prefer shop-
ping in Serbia.
Foreign trade barriers.
Businessmen emphasize they are
encountering: wrong structure of tariffs
(high tariffs on raw materials, low tariffs
on final products), import dependence,
slow procedure for reimbursement of
customs duties paid on raw materials, etc.
Bilateral agreements on trade
preferentials (Free Trade Agreements)
are signed with only five surrounding
countries. Having in mind that Serbia is
not a member of the World Trade
Organization (WTO), conclusion of
such bilateral agreements with the sur-
rounding countries (Romania, Bulgaria
and other countries) would improve
Serbia's foreign trade. 
Public procurements.
Businessmen feel that the Law on
Competitiveness of the Serbian Economy
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Public Procurements should be modi-
fied to favor domestic enterprises.
Dumped export - import. Since
1990 imported textile, clothing and
footwear, household appliances and
numerous consumer goods are dumped
to squeeze out local brands. This prac-
tice is not sanctioned.
3.2. General conclusions of interviews
conducted with businessmen are: enter-
prises expect state activity in terms of
improving foreign trade competitive
advantage, while enterprises themselves
do not take enough action. Most of the
demands come down to assistance in
crediting of export and production.
3.3. Field Survey – The survey was
conducted on a representative sample
of production and trading enterprises.
Collected data was analyzed individual-
ly and through indexes of aggregation.
The most important individual results
follow:  
Motives for export. The main
financial motives for export are improv-
ing business results and lowering costs.
General marketing development on the
market of Serbia was evaluated as poor,
so marketing motives for export almost
do not exist at all. The quality of man-
agement was evaluated much better.
Prices of export products very
much depend on demand. Only one
third of the interviewed businessmen
(mainly exporters of primary and agri-
cultural products) evaluated very posi-
tively the demand for their products,
while exporters of car parts, electro-
technical products and mechanics, con-
fection and metallurgy products have
problems with demand for their prod-
ucts. Source of the price competitive-
ness lies in low costs of resources (labor
and natural resources, 'draining' of the
existing technology). Export is based
mainly on low prices of nonbrand-
name products. 
Almost one half of the interviewed
(45.7%) stated they pay taxes equal to
20% of annual corporate income, while
17,2% stated they pay 31%, even 40%
tax. 
Technological sophistication in
Serbia is evaluated as extremely low.
Businessmen agree that constant inno-
vations are the source of competitive
advantage, but they emphasize they do
not have financial means for innova-
tions. Enterprises themselves do not
conduct much research (with the
exception of pharmaceutical firms).
There are no subsidies for research-
development activities. Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI) is perceived as the
solution. 
Administrative regulations are
often changed, which increases the
costs of their application. Corruption is
present at big tenders and in public
procurements. Therefore, the corre-
spondingly very low trust in politicians
is not surprising.
Foreign Trade Liberalization.
In a very short period (from 2001)
Serbia performed a very rapid liberal-
ization of foreign trade. The country's
antimonopoly policy was evaluated as
unsuccessful and inactive. The law pro-
tects property rights, but practical appli-
cation of legal protections is unsatisfac-
tory. Protection of intellectual property
is evaluated as extremely weak and
inefficient.  Regulations on environmen-
tal protection Serbia are weak, and their
application is inadequate (chaotic).
Infrastructure. Interviewed busi-
nessmen evaluated Serbia's infrastruc-
ture (roads, railway, airports, ports) as
very poor and they consider that the
state priority should be improvement of
information-communication technolo-
gy. Businessmen also stated that the
existing Government programs for pro-
motion of information technology are
not very successful.
3.4. Competitiveness Indexes – The
research on microeconomic competi-
tiveness of Serbian economy generated
results utilizing two aggregate indexes:  
Competitiveness of the Serbian Economy
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1. Growth Competitiveness Index
(GCI);  
2. Microeconomic Competitiveness
Index (MICI).
3.4.1. Growth Competitiveness
Index (GCI). This index measures
capacity of a national economy for
achieving stable economic growth dur-
ing a medium-term period. Various
growth factors have different roles at
different levels of economic develop-
ment. Technology has a key role in all
phases of economic development.
Public institutions are especially impor-
tant in the initial development phases.
Macroeconomic environment has con-
stant importance, but is foremost during
the initial phases.
We have added Serbia and
Montenegro to the Group of 75 coun-
tries, which the World Economic Forum
(WEF) included in its research from
2001. In the final score Serbia and
Montenegro holds 69th position, out of
total of 76 analyzed countries. We
would like to note that the WEF list
includes only half of the world coun-
tries and therefore being at the bottom
of this list does not mean being at the
same time on the bottom of the list con-
sidered by potential investors.
Technology Subindex. With an
index value of 3.16, Serbia is far behind
all transition countries (Ukraine is the
closest, with an index value of 3.68).
Among the countries in the region,
Bulgaria has the worst result, with a sig-
nificantly higher index value of 4.32.
The weakest subindex in this index
(compared to other countries) relates to
information-telecommunication tech-
nologies (ICT) – 2.15, i.e. 75th place,
while the innovation subindex is just
slightly better (1.79 i.e. 65th place).
Public Institutions Subindex. In
case of public institutions index Serbia
and Montenegro hold 51st place.
Romania and Bulgaria follow right
behind, but also the Czech Republic.
Public institutions have significant influ-
ence on economic growth at lower lev-
els of development. 
Macroeconomic Environment
Subindex. Based on macroeconomic
evaluations of competitiveness, Serbia
and Montenegro is ranked on the 73rd
place, among 76 analyzed countries
(2.96). Out of the three subindexes, our
country has: a) an exceptionally good
position in the subindex of share of
public expenditures in GDP during
2000, ranking SCG on the 14th place; b)
a disastrous credit rating – the fact that
we hold 74th position and that the
subindex value is lowest possible (1.01)
speaks in favor of this, and c) fragile
macroeconomic stability (74th place,
index value of 2.78).
Regression analysis indicates that
economies based on technological
products recorded faster growth than
commodities-based economies, which is
the case with Serbia for which key
export products are: frozen fruit, grain,
ore, semi-products, etc. Achieving tech-
nologically advanced production
becomes an imperative of economic
development policy.
3.4.2. Microeconomic Competitive-
ness Index (MICI). The Microeco-
nomic Competitiveness Index (MICI)
provides conceptual framework for com-
parative analysis of basic current com-
petitiveness of national economies. MICI
examines microeconomic basis of a
national prosperity, measured by level
of gross domestic product  per capita
(GDP pc PPP). It is obtained from the
indicators included in the Questionnaire
on attitudes of managers/businessmen
and from two indicators from the offi-
cial statistics: GDP pc PPP and the num-
ber of patents per capita.
Statistically, the most important
variables of microeconomic competi-
tiveness for countries with low GDP per
capita (such as Serbia) are:
a) Variables of business develop-
ment and enterprise strategies: market-
ing development, quality of production
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process, development of trademarks
and nature of competitive advantage
(competitiveness based on cheap
resources or innovation-based competi-
tiveness).
b) The national business environ-
ment was analyzed through elements of
a "diamond of competitiveness". Among
variables of availability of production
factors, infrastructure has the greatest
significance (ports, airports, telecom-
munications, public schools). Among
the terms of demand, the most impor-
tant statistical variables are: presense of
regulatory standards and stringency of
ecological standards. Within the factor
“linked and supporting industries” most
important is quality of domestic suppli-
ers and availability of domestic compo-
nents and parts. Among variables of the
context for shaping strategy important
are: hidden trade barriers and efficiency
of antimonopoly policy.
Based on our analysis, the domes-
tic economy is ranked in the following
manner (in relation to 76 observed
countries):
Ranking according to GDP level 
(PPP principle) 72
Ranking according to Microeconomic
Competitiveness Index 71
Ranking according to business subindex
and enterprise strategy 75
Ranking according to quality of national
business environment subindex 69
Based on the business subindex
and enterprise strategy, in 2000 our
country held the next to the last place -
75th place, ahead of Bolivia. The weak
position, based on the MICI index, is
the result of poor business subindex
and enterprise strategy. The business
environment (although incomplete and
undeveloped) offers more than compa-
nies are ready or capable to use. All
transition countries we are trying to
compare ourselves with (Hungary,
Poland, Czech Republic, Slovenia,
Slovak Republic) are far ahead of us –
according to the total index and also
according to both subindexes. A few
places ahead of us are Romaina and
Bulgaria, according to all the indexes.
Serbia belongs to a group of countries
having appreciated GDP per capita.
That means that our current level of
GDP pc exceeds our real microeco-
nomic competitiveness given by MICI
index and that is unsustainable in the
long term.
4. Sustainability of the Balance of
Payment
According to the current plan, pay-
ment of interest and principal of the
inherited foreign debt, a critical burden
on export and GDP, is to occur in the
period 2007-2009.
By analyzing different scenarios, it
is quite certain that, during the entire
next decade and even after that period,
Serbia will encounter the problem of
foreign investment inflow and support-
ing the deficit of current transactions in
the balance of payment. Projection of
the balance, based on all needs (before
all the balance between consumption
and investments in development) will
depend on the type of development
strategy and economic policy; resources
from domestic GDP, domestic savings
and foreign savings invested, foreign
debt servicing (this also includes budg-
et sustainability), as well as the level of
consumption and the relative social
acceptance of limiting consumption
under the existing circumstances. The
general political climate and political
stability in Serbia should provide an
environment in which this will be real-
istic.
Based on the experiences of suc-
cessful transition countries, the share of
investments in the GDP could reach
25% till the end of the decade. In 2005,
Competitiveness of the Serbian Economy
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that share should reach at least 20%,
while the share of foreign savings in
financing should total approximately
1/3 of total investments.
Foreign debt servicing is sustain-
able only provided foreign saving
inflows through investments from
abroad (in the period 2003 - 2010 they
should cover at least 25% of total invest-
ments), while the commercial debt
before 2009 should not exceed (on
average) 10% of the value of invest-
ments.
Long-term stability should not be
jeopardized since it may lead to efforts
to stabilize the balance of payments
through real depreciation of the dinar.
Even if it temporarily reduces the
deficit, later it increases obligations in
the balance of payments and in the
budget, especially during a critical peri-
od of major a burden of export and
GDP. 
There are critical lower limits of
average economic growth (3%) and
export growth (12%). They are mutual-
ly dependant. Faling below either limit,
irrespective of the other, leads to (dur-
ing the second five-year period of this
decade) exceeding critical limits in
terms of the debt servicing rate and bur-
dening GDP with debt servicing - i.e. it
leads to new external insolvency, to
new reprograms and to new recession.
5. General conclusions
Basically, the issue of increasing
competitiveness comes down to choos-
ing between two development strate-
gies. The first strategy: to make prof-
itable a critical number of enterprises
that are 'below the margin' through
depreciation of the domestic currency,
parallel with strengthening tariffs and
non-tariff protection (protectionism).
This strategy can be used to preserve
and reproduce the inherited economic
structure. In the Serbian economy this
structure is out-of-date and predomi-
nantly compatible with the market that
existed two or three decades ago. The
second strategy starts off from a market
value exchange rate and from the liber-
alization of foreign trade. It stimulates
enterprises that are below the margin of
profitability to increase productivity and
efficiency, to change production pro-
grams and to achieve competitiveness
through technological development and
development of quality. Enterprises that
can not achieve this are closed down. At
the same time new enterprises emerge
that are capable of profit under the
given conditions. This way, investments
are directed at establishing a new, mod-
ern structure of economy; competitive
both on domestic and on foreign mar-
kets. But this requires an open economy
and sound market environment, which
will be suitable for foreign investments
and domestic savings that are aimed at
establishing small and medium enter-
prises to absorb manpower from enter-
prises closed down. This also requires
good social programs, instead of the
social function of subsidizing enterpris-
es 'below the margin'.
Serbia has to build a modern mate-
rial and information infrastructure and
to modernize its enterprises in order to
increase the value-added per employee.
Without foreign capital, our enterprises
can renovate their programs over an
average period of 20 to 25 years.
Enterprises in which foreign savings and
management participate can do this in 3
to 5 years. Relative to the European
industrial countries, the technological
lag of our economy totals  5–6 techno-
logical years, which is equivalent to 30-
35 years in time.
Investments in the modernization of
equipment and production processes is
the key presumption for improving com-
petitiveness and for achieving higher
export growth. And - the increase of
export revenues is the first precondition
for foreign debt servicing and for provid-
ing resources for financing import of
equipment and technology. It is also the
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precondition for economic development
in the years to come. In order to achieve
economic growth, to realize constant
GDP growth and to increase the standard
of employees, Serbia has to reach global
competitiveness – foremost on markets
of the EU countries with which it realizes
the greatest part of its foreign trade and
capital flow and to which it has major
foreign debt. Economic policy has to
develop both competitive and compara-
tive advantages of Serbian economy.
The creation of a favorable climate
for foreign investments transcends ‘stan-
dard’ macroeconomic surmises. FDI
requires application of development
policy free from influence of bureaucra-
cy and free from slow administrative
procedure (registration procedure,
employment procedure, export proce-
dure, profit repatriation, providing legal
protection, etc.). Further, the existence
of transparent and appropriate legal reg-
ulations and efficient banking (i.e. a
finance sector) is assumed. The state
should stimulate and support all
changes that lead to strengthening the
production base and real competitive-
ness of export. Only additional invest-
ments in modern technology and
human capital (knowledge, specializa-
tion, etc.) could increase the growth rate
and thereby ensure two objectives: a) an
increase of the living standard (income
per capita) and b) enabling regular ful-
fillment of obligations toward foreign
creditors (debt servicing). 
Serbia must prepare a complex
development policy (in which one of
the parametars will be attracting foreign
savings – foremost foreign direct invest-
ments which bring, apart from capital,
modern technology and management
processes), to provide export market
and to activate processes that improve
the business of domestic enterprises.
For this purpose, intervention is needed
in many fields. Tax burden for the use
(exploitation) of natural resources and
unrestorable energy sources should be
increased. State financial support should
be preserved only in cases of producers
that realize higher added value. This
would stop economically unjustified
increases of capital intensive produc-
tion, for which results are modest, from
the aspect of value-added growth.  
Priority support should be given to
non-material investments based on
knowledge, modern know-how, inno-
vations and new production techniques.
Serbia should commence production
cooperation and development coopera-
tion with the surrounding countries,
aimed at creating synergistic effects in
some industries and activities. Foreign
investors express great interest in such
cooperation. The examples of the Czech
Republic, Slovak Republic, and transi-
tion Baltic countries offer important les-
sons here. For this purpose, one should
define potential production nuclei
which could include enterprises in pri-
vate and public ownership. It would be
necessary to offer a concrete assistance
in penetrating regional markets.  It is
necessary to stimulate - in cooperation
with foreign partners - regional devel-
opment of concentrated economic
zones attractive for foreign investors
(clusters). 
Since gross labor costs can be com-
pensated only with greater productivity,
economic policy must favor all those
processes and activities that contribute
to increase the volume of production
per employee. The problem of loss of
competitiveness occurs in cases where
an increase in costs is not amortized
with an increased productivity. Non-
price competitiveness factors, such as
quality, design, terms of delivery, servic-
ing, and international quality (certifica-
tion) logos can be crucial for increasing
export, but they alone can not amortize
high relative costs.
As in the case of other transition
countries, the selection of currency
regime is of great importance for Serbia's
economic growth and economic stabili-
ty. There is no ‘best’ version of currency
regime that is set in advance and which
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would maintain constant advantage or
which would represent the best solution
for each individual country. At that, it is
not necessary to make a difference
between fully fixed and fully fluctuating
currency regime, but it is necessary to
make a difference between different lev-
els of flexibility.  The successful devel-
opment of a transition economy (espe-
cially based on the experience of the
Central European countries) is reflected
in the real appreciation of the domestic
currency. Increased productivity in the
trading sector reduces unit costs of pro-
duction, equivalent to the real apprecia-
tion of the exchange rate.
Further, various measures for the
sterilization of money can for some time
reduce the increase of the exchange rate
and ease inflationary pressure, but none
of these measures can fully prevent real
appreciation of a national currency
exchange rate in conditions of constant
and major foreign capital inflow. It is of
special importance that the Central bank
strictly supervises the behavior and
financial balance of commercial banks,
and – if necessary - establishes a special
fund for the insurance of deposits. Also,
realization of regulatory norms and
accounting standards, in commpliance
with the Basel Standards, should be
considered a element of protection of
the country's financial policy. 
The more the Serbian economy
integrates to markets of the EU countries
and to markets of developed transition
countries, the more it will encounter
greater oscillations in capital flow
toward its own financial space and
beyond it. This raises a question on how
to control such flows. The experiences
of other countries indicate that the
reduction of short-term capital
inflows/outflows is a reliable way for
soothing capital flows in domestic finan-
cial space and for preventing its uncon-
trolled flow at the will of speculative
interests.  
6. Agenda for increasing competitive-
ness of Serbian economy
Under the circumstances of mutu-
ally connected and dependant systems,
no individually performed economic
policy can lead to an increase of
Serbia's competitiveness. There is a set
of measures, which would be synchro-
nized, functionally harmonized and
aimed at the same objective.
6.1.  Monetary policy 
i. Follow a neutral currency policy i.e.
to maintain monetary balance as the
key to stability of prices and a bal-
anced exchange rate of the national
currency.
ii. Transfer to a controlled fluctuation
regime instead of the 'quasi fixed'
regime as teh export base increases.
iii. Conduct monetary policy with the
greatest possible reliance on open
market operations and with the
least possible manipulation with
obligatory reserves and credit limits
policy. 
iv. Add elements of sterilization of pri-
mary cash created from foreign cap-
ital inflow.
v. Develop to the maximum the con-
trol functions of the Central bank.
vi. Develop a securities market.
vii. Perform additional capitalization of
banks and, afterwards, to offer
them for sale to a strategic partner
(in principle - up to 49% of owner-
ship rights).
viii. Protect the financial system from
any kind of influence from state
bodies or interest groups.
ix. Set limits to business banks for
redemption of state bonds for cov-
ering the budget deficit. 
x. Modernize and to educate staff in
banking and non-banking financial
institutions, e.g. insurance agencies,
pension funds. 
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6.2. Fiscal policy
i. Commence transfer of a part of the
burden of social protection from the
state to the private sector (which
will indirectly influence develop-
ment of the financial market).
ii. Develop the Second and pillar of
pension insurance.
iii. Introduce the VAT, which will
broaden the tax base.
iv. Introduce two VAT rates: a lower
rate for medicines, children's acces-
sories, public transportation, basic
food products (e.g. 8% and a stan-
dard 20%).
v. Provide instruments for allround tax
collection, along with improvement
of the working organization of tax
institutions.
vi. Redefine fiscal policy from a short-
term (1 year) to a medium-term
financial strategy (3-4 years).
vii. Direct reform of the tax system to
two main directions: broadening
the tax base and lowering marginal
tax rates in all activities, sectors and
industries that directly contribute to
economic development.
viii. Determine the development budget
i.e. to gradually redirect one part of
public expenditures from consump-
tion to investments.
ix. Build the human capacity of the tax
administration and its supervision
bodies.
6.3. Privatization  
i. Improve the existing privatization
model in terms of:
a. Evaluation of offers that include a
development effect - both on a
bought company and on the
entire economy.
b. Allowing participation of portfo-
lio investors, which have to revi-
talize a bought company prior to
next sale.
ii. Restructure unsuccessful companies
prior to privatization only in excep-
tional cases, when this does not
require large resources and when
there is a small risk of failure.
iii. Enact the Bankruptcy Law –neces-
sary for ‘cleaning’ the economy. In
application of this law it is neces-
sary to conduct training of bank-
ruptcy administrators and to estab-
lish social programs and programs
for the recovery of SMEs.
iv. Resources acquired from sale of com-
panies should be directed at crediting
export-development projects. 
6.4. Foreign Direct Investment
i. Ensure non-disriminatory treatment
of foreign investors.
ii. Simplify the entire legal-administra-
tive procedure related to foreign
investments; from the preparation
for production to profit repatriation.
iii. Offer to foreign investors qualified
legal assistance and other kind of
assistance.
iv. Prepare a transparent system of
legal protection of foreign investors.
v. Form special export zones (with tax
and other benefits) aimed at attract-
ing FDI for stimulating develop-
ment of some of the country's
regions. 
6.5.  Development of Small and
Medium Enterprises
Small and medium-size enterprises
(SMEs) will take over the key role in the
transformation of Serbia's economic
structure. Their role is especially dis-
tinctive in the sector of services and
capital unintensive activities. Achieving
appropriate proportion between SMEs
and large enterprises is of vital interest
for the long-term growth of the Serbian
economy's competitiveness. Therefore,
it is necessary to realize several syn-
chronized programs for stimulating
SMEs.
i. Stimulate the development of SMEs
through an Agency for Small and
Medium Enterprises. Small and
medium enterprises should be pro-
vided with:
a.  Assistance in crediting – verifica-
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tion of business plans and assis-
tance in conducting business
policy (financial management);
b.  Assistance in marketing – small
enterprises should use these
services from outsourcing and
terms for exporters should be
more favorable;
c.  Assistance in human resources
management – especially in
education:
• management courses and sales
courses, marketing and busi-
ness organization courses,
• courses on the use of modern
technology, information tech-
nology, logistics,
• new ways of financial busi-
ness (new financial instru-
ments, new modes for obtain-
ing financial resources, risk
management, etc.);
d.  Technical assistance in achiev-
ing export – assistance in real-
ization of complex administra-
tive procedures.
ii. Stimulating cluster development -
regional and economic develop-
ment, by creating conditions for
cooperation of small and large
enterprises in a planned environ-
ment.  
iii. Stimulating cooperation between
domestic SMEs and transnational
companies (TNC) that are investing
in Serbia through FDI. 
iv. Financial support.
• Guarantees for obtaining neces-
sary bank credits;
• Co-financing specific products
and services rather than financing
enterprises (high value-added
products, products for market
sectors, products for certain
attractive markets, tourist servic-
es, etc.).
v. Program for quality. 
• Budget co-financing of organiza-
tional, production, technological
and other changes necessary for
improving quality;
  • Facilitating increased information
flow from the international mar-
ket, aimed at achieving
International Quality Standards;
• Facilitating increased information
flow on new production proce-
dures, and technological solu-
tions.
6.6. Foreign Trade Strategy 
i. Improve technological foundation
of export-oriented enterprises
through state subsidies for the intro-
duction of modern technology in
SMEs and by stimulating the inflow
of foreign technology through com-
plex foreign trade businesses (leas-
ing, franchising, FDI). 
ii. Stimulate innovations and improve-
ment of quality and standardization
systems.
iii. Establish an Export Agency for
export insurance, export crediting
and marketing.
iv. Stimulate export-oriented FDI,
through production in free export
zones. 
v. Regional specialization of export –
conclusion of bilateral agreements
with target countries; development
of business and political partner-
ships.
vi. Improvement of infrastructure of
the foreign trade network and for-
eign trade operations through edu-
cation programs.
vii. Pass the Law on Monopolies.
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1) The sources of chronic crisis
Chronic economic crisis in Serbia,
inherited from the former communist
regime, emerged from the nature of the
economic system and from the devel-
opment and economic policy congruent
with such a system: based on social
ownership defended by a closed, self-
sufficient economy. Those factors led to
deep structural inefficiencies.  Most
essentially, investment fell to negative
values during the 80's, when their share
of GDP halved.
After soverign indebtedness
reached a pinnacle at the end of 1981
(21,1 billion dollars or 15,7 billion dol-
lars more than at the end of 1974) a
blockade on financial transactions was
imposed in 1982 and, beginning in
1983, a series of arrangements with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) was
negotiated. In the period of 1980 to
1984, annual growth of monetary mass
was 28% and during that five-year peri-
od annual inflation reached 44%. 
The result: during the 80s (1979-
1989) annual GDP growth averaed 0,6%
(0% per capita). In 1989 fixed invest-
ments dropped to 15-16% of GDP and
their efficiency became negative – i.e.
the invested dinar was not recovered
through GDP growth.
2) Economic activity and economic poli-
cy in the period 1990-1998
The chronic crisis became critical
with disintegration of Yugoslavia.
Initially, the flow of goods between the
republics was hindered (for instance,
1989 boycott of Slovenian goods in
Serbia, the response of Slovenia, etc.).
In 1990, republic central banks con-
ducted an effort at redistribution in their
favor through unauthorized emission of
money. The defensive mechanism to
conteract this was the suspension of
payment operations between the
republics, which was followed by fur-
ther reduction in the flow of goods.  In
the second half of 1991 the country was
in the civil war, which resulted in sig-
nificant destruction of infrastructure and
the complete suspension of formal eco-
nomic cooperation between individual
republics.
At the end of 1991 the European
Economic Community (EEC) imposed
sanctiones that were only an introduc-
tion into the UN sanctions (imposed in
May 1992). Those sanctions included a
trade and financial embargo. Each
phase of the UN sanctions yielded
stronger negative effects on the coun-
try's economy.  Supply chains and for-
eign trade were interrupted. The
Introduction: 
Economic Crisis in Serbia
Chart 0-1: Efficiency of investments*
Growth in dinars (prices - 1972)
1952-60. 1961-70. 1971-80. 1981-90.
SFRY 38.8 26.8 21.1 -3.5
Bosnia and Herzegovina 28.0 23.8 16.4 -1.2
Montenegro 10.2 16.6 14.9 -5.1
Croatia 44.8 28.7 21.4 -5.9
Macedonia 26.4 21.6 18.7 -3.2
Slovenia 45.3 35.4 24.2 -3.8
Serbia 43.5 26.0 22.5 -2.7
- Central Serbia 37.0 25.7 25.7 -1.2
- Kosovo 36.4 17.0 11.3 -6.8
- Vojvodina 68.7 30.3 19.9 -5.1
* GDP growth on 100 dinars of gross economic investments in fixed
assets 
Source: Development of former SFRY republics; Federal Office for Statistics, 1996
Institute for Economic Sciences estimat-
ed the reduction in industrial produc-
tion of about 40%, which occured in
only few months, was a direct result of
the Security Council sanctions.
Insufficient flexibility of socially-owned
enterprises and the management model
in such enterprises also contributed to
the dramatic fall in production – social-
ly-owned enterprise mangement
expected the state to solve their prob-
lems.
Economic policy was entirely
incompatible with the new situation. At
first, it hesitated to accept the new
objective situation in the economy.
When economic policy finally recog-
nized the new situation, it did not
undertake the necessary radical meas-
ures.  This applies foremost to the radi-
cal reduction of public consumption
and its deficit. Instead, the state (and its
economic policy) supported the social
model of emission-based financing and
state operations based on inflation tax.
This was followed by frequent radical
destabilizing shifts between the state
adjusting the official rate to match the
black market exchange rate to rigid
financing of the official exchange rate;
control and liberalization of prices; etc.
Once financing based on primary emis-
sion was broadened to include the
entire public sector and a number of
large socially-owned enterprises, hyper-
inflation reached a point when the
inflation tax collected by the state was
rapidly vanishing. Forcing enterprises
(August 1993) to sell their goods at
maximized prices resulted in destruc-
tion of the economy's floating capital.
Production almost stopped. The market
was suspended and its remains were
suppressed in the zone of grey econo-
my. In 1993 Yugoslav GDP dropped to
9,5 billion dollars (author's
estimate)with a strong downward trend.
We estimate that Yugoslavia entered
1994 with a GDP of approximately 700
dollars per capita.
The January 1994 Avramovic pro-
gram for reconstruction of the monetary
system cut uncontrolled monetary emis-
sion. Instead of the old currency, which
was nullified with hyperinflation when
monetary mass (M1) was reduced to a
symbolic 50 million DEM. a new dinar
was created and tied to DEM. Over sev-
eral months, remonetization (the injec-
tion of new money into an empty
space) enabled a fast increase in
salaries, growth of the monetary mass
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and the crediting of enterprises that
were selling out their reserves.
Production epanded for nine months,
untill October 1994, when it was inter-
rupted by teh suspension of monetary
emission due to movement in prices
and the creation of a black market
exchange rate.  By that time, the black
market DEM exchange rate was 35%
higher than the official exchange rate.
The second wave of production
growth in the 1980's came after the sus-
pension of sanctions and prior to the
final lifting of sanctions (this was fol-
lowed with devaluation in November
1995). This second wave lasted for five
months, mostly during the second half
of 1996. It faded with the suspension of
monetary expansion which followed
this growth. Shortly after, a third wave
of growth emerged - from the second
quarter of 1997 through the first half of
1998. This growth was connected with
the inflow of up to US$ 1 billion from
the sale of one part of Telekom Srbija
and the injection of that capital into
consumption. Foreign currency solven-
cy was also assured for an increased
import of raw materials. Furthermore,
EU countries granted preferentials for
import of certain products from
Yugoslavia, which sparked a recovery
of export. All these factors drove indus-
trial production and GDP growth.
Industrial production increased at 7,5%,
and then 9,5% in 1997 and 1998.
However, the economy fell back into
recession in the second half of 1998.
The only significant exception in this
trend was the growth of industrial pro-
duction from mid-1999 till mid-2000,
based on inflatory financing. This
growth was only a partial compensation
to the drop that occured during the
NATO intervention.
Social function were left to enter-
prises in this period. During the sanc-
tions, dismissal from work was prohib-
ited by law.  In 1996, the number of
workers in industry was down 22% rel-
ative to 1989. In production of trans-
portation means, production was
reduced to 7% of 1989levels, but 83% of
the number of employees from 1989
were still on the job.. Costs were less-
ened with the moratorium on paying
foreign debts. Activation of due and
payable debts would have stoped the
economy.
This history is important. During
the 90’s, investments were lower than
the write off of the fixed assets and the
structure of the Serbian economy was
the same as at the end of the 70’s. The
capacity of the Serbian economy can be
illustared with its relative status com-
pared to Slovenia. Concretely, in 1989
GDP per capita in Serbia and
Montenegro (excluding Kosovo) totaled
half of GDP in Slovenia. In 2001 GDP of
FRY totaled between 12 and 13% of
Slovenian GDP. A huge gap also
emerged between our country and the
Central European countries (countries
now entering the EU). Serbia’s GDP per
capita is close to one quarter of the
GDP of the “weakest” of those coun-
tries.
During the last decade of the 20th
century the economy was under invest-
ed and less than half of amortization
was flowing back into it. The situation
in industry is especially difficult. Taking
into consideration different models on
the average lifetime of equipment, it
can be concluded that industrial equip-
ment has depreciated to 12%–15% of its
real value from 1989. Its operational
capability is approximately the same.
Some argue that especially industry has
low level of capacity utilization of the
capacities but the argument that activa-
tion of the existing capacities, through
the inflow of sufficient floating capital,
can provide higher growth rates – is a
pure illusion. Our economy needs large
investments and new equipment.
Therefore the problem of investments is
linked with the problem of economic
growth.
3) Foreign Direct Investment and
Development
European countries passed
through two technological cycles during
Serbia's process of disinvestment. This
produced several negative effects. The
most distinctive are slower growth, a
drop of aggregate production, and
falling export competitiveness. Slower
GDP growth disabled domestic savings
necessary for local initiation of new
investments and narrowing the space
for production growth. Consequently,
savings fall still further, local investment
drops even lower, which leads to still
lowewr GDP growth rates. This viscious
cycle can only be broken by foreign
investment capital.
During the last two years, FDI
inflow in Serbia was as follows: 195 mil-
lion dollars in 2001 and 475 million dol-
lars in 2002. For comparitive purposes –
in 2001, Croatia registered a FDI inflow
of 1,4 billion dollars, Romania 1,1 bil-
lion dollars, Bulgaria 0,7 billion dollars,
Macedonia 0,5 billion dollars, Hungary
2,4 billion dollars, Czech Republic 4,9
billion dollars. A large share of foreign
investment in Serbia is directed to the
tertiary sector, e.g. real estate. Greater
FDI inflow in production i.e. in the pro-
cessing sector would influence faster
inflow of modern technology and
know-how, which would have a direct
impact on the improvement of compet-
itiveness of the Serbian economy and
the faster growth of export of goods,
and ultimately on GDP growth. The
practice of all transition countries shows
that enterprises with FDI have better
access to foreign markets than domesti-
cally owned enterprises. In the 1999
structure of total export, the share com-
panies with foreign ownership is: 60,5%
in the Czech Republic, 89% in Hungary,
60% in Poland, 30% in Slovenia. 
FDI greatly contributes to enter-
prise productivity growth.  In Hungary,
firms with FDI are three tims as pro-
ductive as comparable domestically
held firms. In Poland the ratio is- 2,3
times higher and in the Czech Republic
two times higher. FDI brings high capi-
tal intensive technology. When matched
with a high skill low cost labor force,
this yields a comparative advantage in
international markets and subsequently,
high GDP growth rates. 
Since gross labor costs can only be
be compensated with greater productiv-
ity, economic policy has to favor all
processes and activities that contribute
to increasing production per employee.
The problem of loss of competitiveness
occurs in cases when the rising cost of
production is not exc eeded by a faster
rate of increased productivity. At pres-
ent, Serbia has a comparative advantage
in terms of labor costs, but this advan-
tage is the reflection of low wages and
modest social services financed from
gross incomes. Without higher wages, it
is not possible to motivate workers to
work harder and better, to give their
contribution to innovations and devel-
opment in general. This requires supe-
rior products and constant productivity
growth. The domestic economy is not
able to achieve this growth without
massive FDI inflow.
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1990. 1991. 1992. 1993. 1994. 1995. 1996. 1997. 1998. Average
Total 48,3 50,9 51,7 48,6 46,7 41,6 35,3 33,6 32,3 43,2
Industry 36,4 35,1 31,9 31,0 30,1 28,6 25,2 22,2 21,2 29,1
Equipment 20,7 19,4 17,7 13,6 10,2 13,7 11,5 9,7 9,2 14,0
Chart 0-2: Investments according to depreciation in FRY (%): 1990–1998
Source: Statistical Yearbook of Yugoslavia (several issues), Federal Office for Statistics, Belgrade
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6.1. General conclusions
The issue of increasing competi-
tiveness comes down to choosing
between two development strategies.
The first strategy purports depreciation
of the national currency aimed at creat-
ing profitable "critical mass" of enter-
prises that are "below the margin", par-
allel to strengthening tariff and non-tar-
iff protection (protectionism). This strat-
egy would seek to preserve and repro-
duce the existing structure of economy.
In the case of Serbia – this structure is
out-of-date. The second strategy starts
off from a market value exchange rate
and foreign trade liberalization. It stimu-
lates enterprises which are below the
margin of profitability to increase their
productivity and efficiency; to modify
their production programs and to
achieve competitiveness based on tech-
nological improvements and quality.
Enterprises which can not achieve prof-
it are closed down. At the same time,
new enterprises emerge which are capa-
ble of profit under the given conditions.
In this way, investments are directed
toward establishing a new, modern
structure of economy, competitive both
on domestic and on foreign markets.
But, this requires an open economy and
sound market environment, which is
suitable for foreign investments and for
initiating domestic savings aimed at
establishing many small and medium
enterprises that will absorb the man-
power from enterprises closed down.
This strategy also requires social pro-
grams centered on individuals, instead
of the social function of subsidizing
unprofitable enterprises.
Serbia must build a modern materi-
al and information infrastructure, mod-
ernize its enterprises, and ultimately
increase the value-added per employee.
Compared to the European industrial
countries, technological lag of our econ-
omy totals 5–6 technological years,
which is equivalent to 30-35 years in the
time dimension.  Without foreign capital
inflow, our enterprises can modernize
their production capacities over an aver-
age period of 20 to 25 years. Enterprises
in which FDI contribues capital and
management know how can achieve
this modernization in 3 to 5 years. 
Investments in modernization of
equipment and production processes
are the key to improving competitive-
ness and for achieving higher export
growth. And - the increase of export
revenues is the first precondition for for-
eign debt servicing and for providing
resources for financing import of equip-
ment and technology. Export is the pre-
condition for economic development in
the years to come. In order to achieve
economic growth, to realize constant
GDP growth and to increase the
employees' standard of living, Serbia
has to achieve global competitiveness –
foremost on markets of the EU with
which Serbia realizes the greatest part of
its foreign trade and capital flow and to
which it has major foreign debt.
Economic policy must target and sup-
port both competitive and comparative
advantages of the Serbian economy.
Serbia must prepare a complex
development policy. One of the param-
eters of this policy should be attracting
foreign savings – foremost foreign direct
6. Conclusion –
Strategy for a Competitive Serbian
Economy
Competitiveness of the Serbian Economy
6. Conclusion340
investments, which bring in capital,
modern technology and management
processes, opens export markets and
activates processes for improving the
businesses of domestic enterprises. In
order to achieve this aim, intervene is
required in many fields. 
The state should prioritize support
to non-material investments based on
knowledge, modern know-how, inno-
vations and new production techniques.
Serbia should facilitate cooperation with
the surrounding countries, aimed at cre-
ating synergistic effects in some indus-
tries and activities. For this purpose, the
state should define potential production
nuclei that could include private and
public enterprises and offer concrete
assistance in penetrating regional mar-
kets.  Also, it is necessary to stimulate -
in cooperation with foreign partners –
the regional development of concentrat-
ed economic zones attractive for foreign
investors (clusters).
Since only rising productivity can
compensate gross labor costs, economic
policy must favor all processes and
activities that contribute to increasing of
volume of production per employee.
The problem of loss of competitiveness
occurs in cases when rising costs are not
amortized with rising productivity. Non-
price competitiveness factors, such as
quality, design, terms of delivery, servic-
ing, attests and international quality
(certification) logos can be crucial for
increasing export, but they alone can
not amortize high relative costs.
As in the case of other transition
countries, the choice of currency regime
has a great importance for Serbia's eco-
nomic growth and economic stability.
There is no best choice of currency
regime. That said, it is not productive to
debate the ideal positions of a fully
fixed vs a fully fluctuating currency
regime.  Rather, the policy question
revolves around the relative merits of
different levels of flexibility. Successful
development of a transition economy
(especially based on the experience of
the Central European countries) is evi-
dent in a real appreciation of the
domestic currency. Increased productiv-
ity in the trading sector reduces unit
costs of production, equivalent in the
same percentage to real exchange rate
appreciation.
Various measures for the steriliza-
tion of money can for some time reduce
the increase of the exchange rate and
ease inflationary pressure, but none of
the measures can fully prevent real
appreciation of a national currency
exchange rate when there is a constant
and major foreign capital inflow. It is of
special importance that the Central Bank
strictly supervises the behavior and
financial balance of commercial banks,
and – if necessary - establishes a special
fund for deposits insurance. Also, real-
ization of regulatory norms and
accounting standards, in commpliance
with the Basel Standards, should be
considered an essential element of the
country's financial policy.
The ultimate objective of economic
policy is to increase the GDP growth
rate and to maintain it at the level nec-
essary for reducing the gap between per
capita income in Serbia and in the EU
countries, as well as the gap existing
between Serbia and the transition coun-
tries. It is necessary to provide as many
conditions as possible to achieve this
objective.  Except under special circum-
stances and in the short term, the
process of increasing Serbia's GDP per
capita toward the income in the EU is
only possible through constant produc-
tivity growth.
The stability of prices is the basic
postulate of long-term development -
always and in every arrangement of
economic policy. Only long-term stabil-
ity of prices can create a framework for
rising domestic and foreign investment.
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6.2. Harmonization of economic policy
on macro and micro level 
Opinion surveys conducted in
transition Central European countries
indicate that enterprises specify three
strategic objectives as the most impor-
tant for increasing competitiveness:
improvement in the quality of employ-
ees, reducing business costs and
improving the quality of products. All
these objectives can be understood as
the postulates for achieving competitive
advanatage on the decentralized inter-
national market.
In order to build the basis for
strengthening competitiveness of the
Serbian economy and to secure its pos-
itive effects on economic growth and
employment, it is necessary to act in the
following manner:
1) State intervention in industry
should focus on development of activi-
ties in which Serbia can surely realize
dynamic development, such as: accom-
panying industry in engineering, electri-
cal engineering, electronics, car indus-
try, telecommunications. At the same
time, this requires Foreign Direct
Investment and appropriate manpower
training.
2) The state must redefine the tax
burden for certain activities in different
segments of economy: one part of mar-
ginal tax burden should be transferred
from manpower to the use of natural
resources. Direct state financial support
should not depend on the type of enter-
prise, or number of employees, or cap-
ital intensity, but rather on the value-
added the enterprise can potentially
realize. 
3) Cooperation with surrounding
countries should be encouraged to
establish functional relations between
enterprises. This is especially important
for the development of production,
which requires ecological protection
that can be performed by regionally
connected production units rather by a
locally-based enterprise.
4) Priority should be given to cluster
development of competitive activities,
aimed at strengthening regional advan-
tages, along with strengthening standard
export competitiveness (The Europe of
Regions concept requires this).
6.2.1. Monetary policy
i. Follow the policy of neutral curren-
cy i.e. to maintain monetary bal-
ance as the foundation of price sta-
bility and a balanced exchange rate
of national currency.
ii. Aime at progressive transfer to the
controlled fluctuation regime
instead of the quasi-fixed regime.  
iii. Conduct monetary policy with the
greatest possible reliance on open
market operations and with the
least possible manipulation of
obligatory reserves and credit limits
policy. 
iv. Add elements of sterilization of pri-
mary cash created from the foreign
capital inflow.
v. Maximize the control functions of
the Central Bank.
vi. Develop a securities market.
vii. Recapitalize banks and then offer
them for sale (in principle - up to
49% of ownership rights).
viii. Protect the financial system from
any kind of influence from state
bodies or interest groups.
ix. Set limits on commercial banks for
redemption of state bonds for cov-
ering a budget deficit.
x. Educate the staff of bank and non-
bank finnacial institutions in the
operations of a modern financial
market.
6.2.2. Fiscal policy
i. Develop the Second and the Third
pillars of pension insurance (to
influence development of the finan-
cial market).
ii. Introduce a VAT, which will broad-
en the tax base.
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iii. Introduce two VAT rates: a lower for
medicines, children's accessories,
public transportation, basic food
products (e.g. at 8% and a standard
20%).
iv. Provide better instruments for tax
collection, along with improved
working organization of the tax
institutions.
v. Redefine fiscal policy from a short-
term (1 year) to a medium-term
financial strategy (3-4 years).
vi. Reform the tax system in two main
directions: broadening the tax base
and lowering marginal tax rates in
all activities, sectors and industries
that directly contribute to economic
development.
vii. Build a development budget i.e. to
gradually redirect one part of public
expenditures from consumption to
investments.
viii. Educate the tax administration staff
and its supervision bodies.
6.3. Special policies
6.3.1. Privatization 
Privatization is often singled out as
the most important step in the process
of transition to market economy. The
share of private-owned enterprises in
the economy structure, measured by
the profit share in the economy during
a one-year period and measured by the
share in total capital of economy,
should rise in order to increase the
economy's efficieny and effectiveness.
We argue that the privatization
process in Serbia has neglected the
small domestic share holders. In
Slovenia domestic capital is stimulated
to participate in privatization in order to
have the least possible number of enter-
prises owned by foreigners. There
exists a certain number of the citizens in
Serbia who would be willing to invest
small amounts of money in prosperous
domestic enterprises through invest-
ment funds. The problem is the lack of
infrastructure and lack of regulations
that regulate the establishment and
functioning of investment funds. The
state must be more engaged in estab-
lishing plans and issuing guarantees to
citizens who are willing to invest small-
er amounts of capital.
From privatized entreprises one
expects more efficient business, which
should have an impact on increase of
efficiency of the entire Serbian econo-
my and consequently – on its competi-
tiveness on the world market. The col-
lapse of private enterprises represents
the loss to their (private) owners. In
order to secure our economy's compet-
itiveness, it is necessary to secure pas-
sage of an adequate law that regulates
bankruptcy of enterprises. That way,
the "bad tissue" will be removed from
the economy and liberate assets to be
reallocated to development and growth.
However, it is not good for a coun-
try if a large number of enterprises col-
lapse frequently. That yields manpower
fluctuation, variations in the number of
employees, as well as variations in
incomes realized from taxes and trans-
actions and from profit of corporations.
There are some enterprises that can sur-
vive in the long term, with small finan-
cial and organizational assistance.
Therefore, measures are needed for the
recovery of enterprises that face trou-
bles, but whose existence is not jeop-
ardized. A great responsibility lies on
those who should evaluate the enter-
prises. Saving enterprises that are not
worth saving since they can not be
recovered in the long term can have
very negative effects on efficiency of
domestic economy and on its competi-
tiveness on the world market. 
Foreign capital inflow in Serbia
during the privatization process is a
positive thing. But we have to protect
ourselves from cases when Serbian
enterprises are beeing bought (priva-
tized) and then closed down, which
results in monopolization of the market
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of Serbia on the part of foreign enter-
prises entering our market during the
privatization process. The contracts
according to which foreign investors are
obligated to invest and to perform some
other activities are not sufficient instru-
ments for preventing monopolization of
the market. This can be done through
passing adequate Antimonopoly laws
i.e. free competition laws. On the other
hand, one should follow the experience
and regulations of the EU and men-
tioned laws should not be an obstacle
to enterprises aimed at increasing their
competitiveness on the world market. 
Since Serbia has a big problem
with the trade deficit and balance of
payments deficit and with capital out-
flow based on the payments of foreign
credits, it is recommended that capital
inflow from abroad arrive in the form of
foreign direct investments that do not
cause imbalance of capital balance, for
example when capital arrives in the
form of loans. 
Urgent measures, in terms of the
privatization, are:
i. Improve the existing privatization
model:
a. Evaluate positively offers that
include development effect –
both on a privatized enterprise
and on the entire economy.
b. Allow participation of portfolio
investors, which have to revital-
ize a privatized enterprise prior
to next sale.
ii. Restructure unsuccessful enterprises
prior to privatization only in excep-
tional cases, when this does not
require large resources and when
there is a small risk of failure.
iii. Enact the Bankruptcy Law. Train
bankruptcy administrators and
establish social programs and pro-
grams for recovery of SMEs.
iv. Resources acquired from sale/priva-
tization of enterprises should be
directed at crediting export-devel-
opment projects.
6.3.2. Foreign Direct Investment 
Today, when there is a lack of
domestic capital, when the economy
suffers from a chronic balance of pay-
ments deficit – FDI is considered the
most suitable means of capital inflow.
These investments are considered a
good instrument for increasing the
employment rate, especially in cases
when foreigners establish new enter-
prises (greenfield operation). FDI is
suitable for the transfer of knowledge,
modern technology, quality and the
development of export-oriented pro-
duction, since very often the domestic
market is too small to support a prof-
itable volume of production. A majority
of countries are trying to attract foreign
direct investments by giving various
allowances to foreign investors doing
business on their territories. Due to
strong world competition, these
allowances become more and more sig-
nificant and sometimes, when starting a
business, foreign investors are given
more favorable conditions for doing
business than domestic businessmen .
However, while developed coun-
tries have almost no limitations con-
cerning foreign capital, developing
countries tend to keep some limitations
in order to preserve economic sover-
eignty. Developed countries acknowl-
edge one to another the status of the
most favored nation (in the field of
investments as well), which purports
that there exists no discrimination of
foreign investors compared to domestic
investors. But developing countries
refuse to accept this principle in the
international financial relations by
refusing to sign the Multilateral
Agreement on Investments – MAI,
passed under the auspices of the
OECD.
There are some standard terms that
countries have to fulfill when attracting
foreign private capital. These standards
are mainly related to the freedom in
business of foreign investors (except in
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some fields concerning national safety),
freedom of initial investment repatria-
tion and profit remittances, freedom of
employment and discharge and the like.
All these measures are important for
efficient business of enterprises. 
For attracting FDIs, many countries
establish specialized agencies aimed at
promotion of a country as an ideal des-
tination for investments. Those agencies
provide all necessary information to for-
eign investors who want to get infor-
mation about the business environment
of a certain country. Serbia already has
one such agency and its work should
be made more efficient. 
A country’s participation in regional
economic integration can be an impor-
tant factor for attracting investments.
Serbia should conclude Free Trade
Agreements with the Western Balkan
countries that will be out of the EU after
2004 and create possibilities for regional
economic integration with these coun-
tries. In this way, Serbia would improve
its position in terms of foreign direct
investments inflow. Large foreign com-
panies usually establish branches in cen-
tral countries of a regional economic
integration, aimed at supplying the mar-
ket of the entire integration.
Another factor which can be
important for attracting FDI is the exis-
tance of special export zones in which
enterprises with foreign capital have
special customs and tax allowances.
Sherbia has a large number of these
zones and the Government should sup-
port their work and create conditions
for their future growth and develop-
ment.
Specifically:
i. Ensure non-disriminatory treatment
of foreign investors.
ii. Simplify the entire legal-administra-
tive procedure related to foreign
investments - from the preparation
for production to profit repatriation.
iii. Offer to foreign investors qualified
legal assistance and other kind of
assistance.
iv. Prepare a transparent system of
legal protection of foreign investors.
v. Form special export zones (with tax
and other benefits/allowances)
aimed at attracting FDI to stimulate
development of some of the coun-
try's regions.
6.3.3. Development of Small and
Medium Enterprises
At the beginning of the 21st centu-
ry small and medium enterprises are
taking over the dominant position in
the structure of Serbia's economy.  This
process is characteristic of the produc-
tion sector, the service sector and also
for the country's foreign trade network. 
The emerging structure is the result
of the collapse of large production sys-
tems (from the period of socialism), the
privatization process and stimulation of
entrepreneurial activity in a significant
part of the working population.
Entrepreneurial businesses engage
fewer workers, they are flexible and
they do not require a large cash reserve.
Foreign capital will come from two
main channels: through venture capital
– during the initial phases of opening of
the economy and through investments
of Transnational Companies (TNC),
which are financially powerful since
they cover the markets of a large num-
ber of countries and since they act glob-
ally.
This raises the question: how to
reconcile on the Serbian market the
dominant transnational capital and the
prevailing structure of small and medi-
um local entreprises? Foreign capital
inflow and the entry of transnational
companies can be stimulative, but also
destructive for the development of a
country's small and medium enterpris-
es. The destruction of the market struc-
ture of small and medium enterprises
can be the result of monopoly behavior
of TNCs. In order to prevent this sce-
nario, it is necessary to support the
development of small and medium
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enterprises with economic policy meas-
ures (foremost targeted at enterprises
from competitive sectors) through the
establishment of an Agency for Small
and Medium Enterprises Support.  This
agency should:
i. Help improve businesses of SMEs
through a system of consulting;
ii. Improve cooperation between
SMEs;
iii. Facilitate cooperation between
SMEs and the financial sector;
iv. Support development of export
competitive SMEs;
v. Support development of small and
medium enterprises that fufill con-
ditions to become part of the sup-
ply chain of incoming transnational
companies;
vi. Support modern technology inflow
to small and medium enterprises;
vii. Support improved structure of
employees employed with small
and medium enterprises.
Small and medium enterprises can
be irreplaceable sub-suppliers of large
companies that locate their production
in a host-country. It is necessary to pro-
vide support to the sector structure of
small and medium enterprises that
would be compatible with large
transnational companies. Since transna-
tional companies are oriented toward
global business, small and medium
enterprises - as their suppliers – realize
through this cooperation:
i. Possibility for direct export produc-
tion (through incorporation in final
product); 
ii. Improvement of production com-
petitiveness, since SMEs can be
suppliers of large companies only
provided they fulfill criteria of the
determined standards and quality.
This increases competitiveness of
small and medium enterprises and
domestic economy in general;
iii. Increased engagement of domestic
capacities and additional manpow-
er.
Small and medium enterprises do
not have the critical mass of high-tech-
nology components necessary for
increasing competitiveness. Therefore
we recommend that small and medium
enterprises be encouraged to locate in
technology parks in determined zones,
in order to enable greater use of the
most important modern resource –
research and development that lead to
technological development. 
In these clusters – if possible in free
export zones – small and medium enter-
prises would be gather around a certain
number of transnational companies (and
a smaller number of domestic ones)
which are protagonists of development
and organized research-development
activity. Research-development laborato-
ries and the concentration of scientists in
technology parks reduce waste of
national research potentials and enable
small and medium enterprises to keep
the pace with the modern technology
(despite their relatively limited
resources).
In those zones small and medium
enterprises would be given special ben-
efits and allowances in terms of customs
and tax duties. This is especially impor-
tant since the World Trade Organization
is not restrictive toward subsidies aimed
at development of undeveloped regions
and introduction of modern technology
in companies.
Such development strategy of small
and medium enterprises within technol-
ogy parks and special industrial or free
export-production zones is also present
in the European Union, while Serbia's
neighbour, Hungary, has established
over 144 zones, in which production is
realized under more favorable terms. In
Serbia about 13 free export - production
zones exist that have satisfactory infra-
structure and that could be used for
development of small and medium
enterprises. 
One such zone, a technology park,
was established by a major manufactur-
er of pharmaceutical products –
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Hemofarm from Vr‰ac, in the Vr‰ac
industrial zone. The idea is to locate near
Hemofarm, as the developement leader,
small and medium enterprises which
would be supported by Hemofarm,
while small and medium enterprises
would be included in Hemofarm supply
chain through a complementary produc-
tion program. 
Small and medium-size enterprises
– SMEs - will take over the key role in
the transformation of Serbia's economic
structure. Their role is especially distinc-
tive in the sector of services and capital
unintensive activities. Achieving appro-
priate proportion between SMEs and
large enterprises is of vital interest for
the long-term growth of the Serbian
economy's competitiveness. Therefore, it
is necessary to realize several synchro-
nized programs for stimulating SMEs.
